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THE INCOHERENCE OF PUNISHMENT IN ANTITRUST
SPENCER WEBER WALLER*
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust began with the common law tort of restraint of trade
but has long since separated itself from the rest of tort law, particu-
larly in the area of punishment. Since the passage of the Sherman
Act in 1890, the principal remedies for antitrust violations have been
criminal penalties and private treble damage suits. Antitrust stands
relatively unique in the American tort universe with its treble damage
remedy, its lack of punitive damages, its rejection of in pari delicto
defenses, the peculiar combination of joint and several liability, the
lack of contribution, and the way that settlements are credited against
the potential liability of the remaining defendants in a case.
What has happened over the past 110 years is that the level of
criminal punishment, both in terms of imprisonment of individuals
and fines for corporations, has increased dramatically along with the
vigor of government criminal enforcement of the antitrust laws. On
the private side, the vigorousness of private treble damage litigation
has waxed and waned depending on a number of factors, including
the degree of activity by the federal government bringing illegal
activity to light as well as the expansion and contraction of both
substantive theories of liability and of standing.
Recently, the addition of several new theories and new actors in
the United States and abroad has dramatically increased the potential
punishment for certain defendants in certain types of cases. The
government now routinely seeks criminal fines equal to double the
gain or double the loss stemming from the unlawful activity. Treble
damage class actions on behalf of direct purchasers are almost certain
to follow. Treble damage actions on behalf of indirect purchasers
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under state law in either state or federal court are equally almost
certain to follow. Adding to the stew is the Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("FTC"), which has dramatically changed the landscape by
successfully asserting a right to seek disgorgement in antitrust actions.
State attorneys general are equally likely to sue, under some combi-
nation of state and federal law, on behalf of natural persons and state
agencies injured by the unlawful activity. Finally, foreign govern-
ments are enforcing their own competition laws and foreign purchas-
ers are increasingly seeking relief in U.S. courts in the form of treble
damages for the same activity and for lesser damages in their own
jurisdictions.
Prominent critics such as Judge Richard Posner have criticized
the present system as amounting to the unleashing of "cluster bombs"
against defendants.' Others have attacked the treble damage remedy
as amounting to less than actual damages in the real world once such
factors as lack of prejudgment interest, the time value of money,
failure to account for societal welfare losses or umbrella effects,
litigation costs, and tax effects are taken into account.2
Rather than reenter that debate about a phenomenon that is
unlikely to change, I would like to address a different and less fre-
quently addressed issue relating to a different form of incoherence in
the present system of public and private antitrust enforcement. We
have reached a point where certain conduct prohibited by the anti-
trust laws is indeed punished harshly, yet other violations of the laws
are effectively immune from punishment because of an evolving
system of government enforcement priorities, substantive changes in
the standards of liabilities, and restrictive rules of standing and
antitrust injury which place some violations beyond effective change.
Even some per se violations of the rule are beyond the reach of any
meaningful punishment. It is not that antitrust damages are necessar-
ily too high or too low, it is that they vary dramatically and that there
is no a priori way to predict where punishment in a particular case or
for a particular defendant will come out. This is the real but over-
looked incoherence of antitrust punishment.
This often-overlooked fact has implications far beyond the world
of antitrust. Antitrust is far more estranged from the tort system than
1. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, Address at AU/ABA Conference
(Sept. 14, 2000), in 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001).
2. Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 115 (1993).
208 (Vol 78:207
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most people acknowledge, even though antitrust violations are
superficially similar to the types of business torts which generate the
greatest amount of punitive damage awards. Unfortunately, the
incoherence of the system of punishment in antitrust suggests that
both sides of the tort reform debate must look elsewhere for support
for their argument. The reality of punishment in antitrust makes it a
poor model for those tort reformers arguing for fixed multiples of
compensatory damages in place of jury-based punitive damages. Nor
does it help those arguing that the present system of punitive dam-
ages provides a reasonably certain outcome approximating something
close to treble compensatory damages in most cases.3 The unpredict-
ability and the occasional windfall that plagues the general tort world
still exists in antitrust despite a congressional command that plaintiffs
recover three times their damages. While we are all prepared to
debate the definition and proof of damages in a complex business
case, whb would have thought that we would also have to debate the
meaning of the term "three?" 4
I. THE BASIC STATUTORY SCHEME
The basic statutory scheme for antitrust is short and deceptively
simple. The principal antitrust legislation could fit on a single sheet
of paper if not a three-by-five note card. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade.5 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization,
attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize. 6 The
Clayton Act specifies a handful of additional civil violations such as
anticompetitive mergers, price discrimination, tying, and exclusive
dealing contracts, which are increasingly interpreted as requiring the
same type of proof as the basic Sherman Act offenses.7 Section 5 of
the FTC Act prohibits unfair methods of competition and authorizes
the FTC to seek cease and desist orders in response to essentially any
violation of the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws.8
3. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997).
4. Compare Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The Failure of the Word
"Bird", 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 536 (1990).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
6. Id.§2.
7. Id. §§ 13, 14, 18.
8. Id. § 45.
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The Sherman Act makes a violation of the act a felony punish-
able by up to three years imprisonment for individuals and hefty fines
for individuals and business entities.9 Section 4 of the Clayton Act
provides that those persons (natural and otherwise) injured in their
business or property by reason of an antitrust violation may recover
treble their damages plus attorneys' fees and costs. 10 A different part
of the Clayton Act also provides for suits for injunctive relief."
The vast majority of antitrust enforcement comes through pri-
vate damage suits. Government enforcement focuses on several
objectives, including: criminal prosecution of the hardcore (or per se)
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act such as price fixing, bid
rigging, and market allocation schemes between competitors; seeking
injunctive relief against anticompetitive mergers and joint ventures;
and the occasional big-ticket civil, nonmerger suit best illustrated by
the long running Microsoft litigation. 2
The remainder is private litigation. Private litigation consists of
two general types. Some of the largest cases are suits between large
competitors seeking a strategic advantage through litigation. 13 These
cases closely resemble ordinary business tort cases, albeit with the
treble damage and attorneys' fees kicker.
The rest of the cases are more closely aligned with the core pur-
poses of the antitrust laws. These cases typically are treble damage
claims from direct purchasers 4 who were victims of price fixing or
similarly per se unlawful conduct. Frequently, but not always, such
civil suits are preceded by government criminal prosecutions of the
defendants, enabling the plaintiffs to take advantage of a statutory
provision making any verdict in a government antitrust case prima
facie evidence in subsequent private litigation."5 Again frequently,
but not inevitably, the private follow-on litigation takes the form of
9. Id. §§ 1-2.
10. Id. § 15.
11. Id. § 26.
12. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (final opinion on
liability with case on remand regarding remedy).
13. See, e.g., MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081(7th Cir. 1983); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see generally Arthur D. Austin, Negative Effects of Treble
Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust Strategy, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1353 (1978)
(discussing antitrust lawsuits between competitors, and labeling such conduct "the new antitrust
strategy").
14. Under federal antitrust law, generally only direct purchasers have standing to bring
treble damage claims. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 727-29 (1977).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
[Vol 78:207
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multiple class actions brought by counsel working on contingency,
which are consolidated under multidistrict litigation procedures and
eventually settled. Depending on the timing (or existence) of the
government criminal investigation, the civil case may well be settled
before the criminal case because of the prima facie effect of the
criminal verdict and the defendants' need to show restitution through
settlement prior to criminal sentencing.16 Particularly large and
sophisticated victims frequently will opt-out of such settlements and
pursue their own claims to verdict or separate settlement through
retained counsel.
II. INCOHERENCE AT ITS CORE
The typical schizophrenic analysis of the rationale for treble
damages goes something like this:
The treble damage remedy serves, of course, to compensate private
persons for their injuries. Trebling those damages punishes the de-
fendant for his violation.... Such awards generate a powerful in-
centive for injured persons to detect, disclose, attack, and end
violations of the antitrust laws. Private enforcement thus increases
the likelihood that a violator will be found out, greatly enlarges the
penalties and thereby helps discourage illegal conduct. The statu-
tory scheme thus supplements public enforcement, which is inevi-
tably selective and not always likely to concern itself with local,
episodic, or less than flagrant violations. 7
Another set of recent commentators state more succinctly: "[t]he
case for private enforcement thus rests on twin goals: deterrence and
compensation."'1 8 More law- and economics-oriented scholars focus
mostly on the deterrence value of treble damages, normally analyze
the appropriateness of treble damages in terms of overdeterrence or
underdeterrence, and frequently reach differing conclusions depend-
16. Because of the pendency or likelihood of treble damages, courts rarely order separate
restitution. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 792 (5th
ed. 2002).
17. PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 149-50 (1978); see ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY 16-21 (1986) (noting that treble
damages compensate victims, encourage enforcement, deter violations, deprive violators of
fruits of unlawful gains, and punish violators).
18. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 912 (2000); see Malcolm E. Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage
Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1319 (1973) (analyzing treble damages exclusively in
terms of deterrence and compensation). For a recent judicial statement of this twin pronged
basis for antitrust treble damages, see Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Interna-
tional, 256 F.3d 799, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
2003]
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ing on the precise antitrust offense at issue.19 Otherwise, most noted
treatises and commentators echo the more pluralistic view of the
goals of private treble damage remedies, but only occasionally put
punishment at the forefront.20 The case law is similarly diverse,21 and
the available historical materials simply do not shed any substantial
light on the intent of the drafters. 2
Deterrence and compensation are only two of the three legs of
the antitrust treble damages stool. Although rarely discussed, such
damages must also be considered an explicit form of punishment for
the defendants. Treble damages are the sole damages for an antitrust
violation. Separate punitive damages are not allowed based on the
19. See WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1986); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW § 15.6 (1985); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 17 (2d ed. 1999); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 542-45
(2d ed. 1981); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISION, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 3.02 (2d ed. 1994); Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White,
Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST
LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 31-34 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988); William
Breit, Efficiency and Equity Considerations, 8 Sw. U. L. REV. 539 (1976); cf Herbert Hovenk-
amp, Treble Damages Reform, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 233 (1988) (summarizing but critiquing the
optimal deterrence model).
20. See, e.g., JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION 171-72 (2d ed. 2001); Clyde J. Cooper, Jr., Treble Damages-Reward for Private
Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Laws, 32 DICTA 293, 294 (July-Aug. 1955); Alfred L. Parker,
The Deterrent Effect of Private Treble Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M. L. REV. 286 (1973);
Dr. George S. Stigler et al., Report of the Stigler Task Force on Productivity and Competition, 2
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 13, 32-33 (1969); Lawrence Void, Are Threefold Damages Under
the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 KY. L.J. 117 (1939-40).
21. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,472-73 (1982) (discussing treble damages
in terms of compensation, encouraging private enforcement, and deterrence); Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1979) (discussing compensation and deterrence); Pfizer
Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (discussing compensation, deterrence, and depriving
violators of the fruits of their illegal conduct); I11. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977)
(discussing compensation, encouraging private enforcement, deterrence and depriving violators
of the fruits of their illegal conduct); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
485-86 (1977) (discussing compensation, deterrence, and punishment); Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (encouraging private enforcement); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) (discussing compensation and encourag-
ing private enforcement); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968) (depriving violators of the fruits of their illegal conduct); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (encouraging private enforcement).
22. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 17, at 18-19. It is interesting to note
that Senator Sherman's original antitrust legislation contained a provision for double damages,
which was criticized as inadequate, and that the Judiciary Committee amended the bill to
provide for the current structure of treble damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. Why treble
damages were considered adequate when double damages were not is not explained by anything
other than arithmetic. Cf THIS IS SPINAL TAP (MGM 1984) (guitar player of heavy metal band
arguing that amplifier with dial running from one to eleven is louder than an equal power
amplifier with dial running only to ten because "eleven is more.").
[Vol 78:207
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rationale that "the enhancement of damages in an antitrust case is the
damages trebled. '23 When states sue in their parens patriae capacity,
the damages obtained may be deemed a "civil penalty" and deposited
with the state as general revenues. 24
The punishment rationale for treble damages even carries over
into the tax treatment of antitrust damages. Any verdict or settle-
ment in excess of actual loss is taxable as ordinary income. Thus,
two-thirds of treble damages would be subject to ordinary income tax
treatment.25  Conversely, from a defendant's perspective, when civil
suits follow government action, amounts compensating for actual
economic injury may be deductible, but the amount beyond compen-
satory damages-the punitive portion of the award-is not.26
One small recent example of the confusion over the fundamental
purposes behind the treble damage remedy came in the Fifth Circuit's
recent decision in Investment Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licens-
ing, Inc. ,27 which concerned whether an arbitration clause covering
antitrust disputes would be enforceable given language barring
punitive damages.2  In Investment Partners, the owner of a photo
processing franchise brought an antitrust suit against the franchisors
in federal court.2 9 The defendants sought to compel arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration clause that both sides agreed governed the
dispute in question.30 The plaintiffs argued that the arbitration clause
was void because the clause prohibited the award of "punitive dam-
ages" and thus the arbitrator could not award the required treble
23. McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1381 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Brown v.
Presbyterian Healthcare Se'vs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting McDonald);
Spence v. Southeastern Alaska Pilots' Ass'n, 789 F. Supp. 1014, 1029 (D. Alaska 1992) (citing
McDonald). In reality, the issue is somewhat more complex because plaintiffs often can join
antitrust claims with other statutory violations, business torts, and fraud claims which may
permit the awarding of punitive damages. Whether a successful plaintiff may receive jury-based
punitive damages instead of or in addition to the treble damages for the antitrust claim depends
on the factual and evidentiary overlap of the claims. The various strategies for plaintiffs and
defendants facing these issues is discussed in Geraldine Alexis & Andrea Deshazo, Is Bifurca-
tion Right for Your Case?, 16 ANTITRUST 82 (Summer 2002).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 15e (2000).
25. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
26. I.R.C. §§ 162(g), 186 (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 1.186(c)(1) (2000).
27. 298 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002).
28. It appears that the parties sought to draft the broadest possible arbitration clause
governing all potential disputes and did not have antitrust specifically in mind since traditional
jury-based punitive damages are not available in antitrust cases. See Alexis & Deshazo, supra
note 23.
29. 298 F.3d at 315.
30. Id. at 316.
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damages for the antitrust issue being disputed.3' Against a back-
ground that all doubts would be resolved in favor of arbitration, the
court held that the punitive damage waiver did not bar treble dam-
ages and that the arbitration was thus not against public policy.32
The court struggled mightily against the Supreme Court's own
language in allowing arbitration of certain antitrust disputes where
the Court noted that, while the primary purpose of treble damages
was remedial, "treble damages also play an important role in penaliz-
ing wrongdoers. . . . ",33 The Court dismissed other Supreme Court
statements linking punishment and treble damages as essentially
dictum arising in other contexts. 34 As a matter of logic, the best that
the court can muster is to draw the distinction "from the standpoint of
the parties' expectations when they entered the arbitration agree-
ment, between statutory treble damages and common law punitive
damages. ' 35 Even so, the court is forced to acknowledge that "anti-
trust treble damages may indeed be 'punitive' simply because they
exceed the actual damages that have been inflicted on the vic-
tim. ... "36
The Investment Partners decision may make sense as a pragmatic
attempt to limit an opportunistic party from weaseling out of an
agreement to arbitrate all its business disputes, but it runs counter to
the intuition, history, and drafting of the antitrust laws and the
consistent recognition of the pluralistic purposes of statutory treble
damages as partially punitive in nature.
Punishment also seems to be at the forefront of those other lim-
ited American statutes that permit multiple damages. The RICO
statute borrowed the treble damage remedy from antitrust with
proponents arguing a similar combination of deterrence, compensa-
tion, and punishment. 37 Similarly, the False Claims Act has a treble
damage provision premised at least in part on punishment of the
defendant for past conduct.3" Multiple damage provisions can also be
31. Id.
32. Id. at 318.
33. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985).
34. Inv. Partners, 298 F.3d at 317.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 318.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000); G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts- Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP.
L.Q. 1009, 1037-39, 1048 (1980).
38. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000); see Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 784-86 (2000.) But see Gregory G. Brooker, The False Claims Act: Congress
[Vol 78:207
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found in patent, trademark, labor law, consumer protection, and even
landlord-tenant law premised on punishing either willful violations of
the law or the exploitation of a particularly vulnerable type of plain-
tiff.3 9
While by no means considered the kind of activity normally con-
demned as malum in se under the criminal law, there is a lengthy and
venerable tradition of recognizing at least certain hardcore antitrust
violations as morally offensive and worthy of punishment. In the
book of Samuel in the Old Testament there is a parable about a rich
man with great flocks of sheep who killed the single sheep of a nearby
poor competitor to serve to a traveler. When informed of this injus-
tice, King David ordered the rich man killed but also ordered "four-
fold" payment to the injured party. 0 Similarly, in ancient Greece, a
ring of corn dealers convicted of fixing prices by cornering the market
were sentenced to death.41 Aristotle also mentions an instance where
the dictator of Sicily punished a merchant who monopolized the iron
ore market on the island with exile. 2 In medieval England, the
common law prohibited engrossing, forestalling, and other early
forms of price fixing and cornering, and even provided treble dam-
ages as the appropriate relief.43
The way the rest of the world in modern times views treble dam-
ages confirms their punitive nature. Most nations are reluctant to
provide judicial assistance to private U.S. antitrust plaintiffs on the
grounds that such treble damage litigation is quasi-criminal in nature
and not traditional civil or commercial litigation meriting judicial aid
pursuant to letters rogatory or the doctrine of comity.44 Similarly,
other nations have been reluctant to enforce U.S. antitrust judgments
Giveth and the Courts Taketh Away, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 374, 387-88 (2002) (questioning
punitive nature of treble damages under False Claims Act in Vermont Agency given previous
treatment of the issue by the Court and Congress).
39. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2000) (trademarks); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (patents); see
generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 3.12 (2d ed.
1993).
40. 2 Samuel 12:1-6 (quoted in Vold, supra note 20, at 118).
41. Lambros E. Kotsiris, An Antitrust Case in Ancient Greek Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 451, 454
(1988).
42. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 57 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard University Press 7th ed. 1977).
The moral force of this story is somewhat undercut by the fact that the dictator subsequently
took over the operation of the monopoly for himself.
43. WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 18-52 (1965); Donald
Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759 (1955).
44. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Can. Ltd., [1980] 111 D.L.R. 3d 74 (Can. S. Ct.); In Re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., (1977] 78 D.L.R. 3d 3 (Ont. High Ct. ); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [19781 A.C. 547 (H.L. 1977).
20031
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on comity grounds or to commit to do so pursuant to treaty because
of its punitive nature.4 5
III. REMEDIES AND ENFORCERS MULTIPLY
The blurry and conflicting rationales for treble damages did not
matter much prior to the modern era of antitrust litigation. Until the
1960s, there were simply very few successful private antitrust plain-
tiffs or advantageous settlements.4 6  It matters very much today
because of the unintended and unexpected multiplication of enforcers
and remedies.
One would expect punishment to be the primary goal of the
criminal enforcement of the antitrust laws. The Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department may bring either criminal or civil actions for
violations of the Sherman Act. It typically limits criminal prosecution
to so-called "per se" or "hardcore" violations of section 1 of the
Sherman Act such as price fixing, bid rigging, market division, or
customer allocation schemes among horizontal competitors.4 1 Crimi-
nal prosecutions of other "restraints of trade" in violation of section 1
are possible but normally eschewed either for substantive antitrust
policy (ambiguous or changing views of the effects on competition) or
because of the impossibility of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Criminal prosecutions under section 2 of the Sherman Act for mo-
nopolization or attempted monopolization are also possible but have
not been undertaken for decades. 48
Individuals convicted of Sherman Act violations may be impris-
oned for up to three years.49 Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, substantial prison terms are now routine, depending on the role
of the individual in the unlawful conspiracy and the amount of
commerce affected by the unlawful agreement.
45. See British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] Ch. 19 All E.R.
780 (C.A. 1952); see also JAMES R. ATWOOD ET AL., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD § 4.16 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing the enactment of blocking statutes in various countries
barring the enforcement of treble damage awards).
46. MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 106 (4th ed. 1997); Charles A.
Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage Antitrust Action,
14 SETON HALL L. REV. 17, 18-21 (1983).
47. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 16, at 737-38.
48. See United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., Crim. No. 1842 (E.D. La. 1969) (last
criminal monopolization indictment discovered by author).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
[Vol 78:207
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The fines for individuals and corporations heavily depend on the
amount of commerce affected by the conspiracy. The fine is now a
maximum of $350 thousand for individuals and $10 million for
corporations, 0 or double the gain or loss caused by the illegal con-
duct.51 The latter method of calculation for fines has produced guilty
pleas calling for fines up to $500 million dealing with lengthy global
conspiracies for core products in the economy and a number of fines
in excess of $100 million.52
Where the government acts, private litigation normally follows.
In this setting, private litigants are aided by section 5 of the Sherman
Act, which states that a favorable verdict in a government antitrust
action (either civil or criminal) is prima facie evidence in any subse-
quent private enforcement action. Since this means in most civil
actions that a private plaintiff need only prove standing and damages,
settlement normally follows or precedes the criminal verdict. For
nonsettling defendants, the prospects are even bleaker unless they
prevail on the merits. Antitrust violators are not entitled to contribu-
tion against fellow antitrust tortfeasors.53 Moreover, as a result of
joint and several liability, any settlements paid along the way are only
deducted after damages are trebled,5 4 leaving a sole nonsettling
defendant potentially liable for a disproportionate share of the total
damages.
Therefore, the question normally is not if, but when to settle.
For example, the recent criminal price fixing case involving Sotheby's,
the international auction house, was preceded by a $512 million
settlement of a private treble damage class action, presumably to
avoid the prima facie effect of a guilty plea and the resulting loss of
even further bargaining leverage by the civil defendants.5 As in most
criminal antitrust cases, the court at sentencing did not impose any
further restitution.5 6
50. Id.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000).
52. Scott D. Hammond, From Hollywood to Hong Kong- Criminal Antitrust Enforcement
is Coming to a City Near You, 14 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 567, 570 (2002)
53. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
54. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 18, § 17.8B.
55. Christie's, Sotheby's competitor and coconspirator, was not charged in the govern-
ment's criminal case because of its cooperation and participation in the corporate amnesty
program. It remained, of course, a defendant in the private actions.
56. See Peter Sullivan, Antitrust Around the World, 2000 ANTITRUST REP. 1 (Oct. 2000).
In most cases, it is the pending, rather than the settled private cases which provide the basis for
not imposing formal restitution in the criminal case. See, e.g., United States v. F. Hoffman-La
Roche Ltd., Crim. No. 99-CR-184-R, Guilty Plea I 8(b) (Filed May 20, 1999).
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The other federal government antitrust enforcer is the FTC. The
FTC's historic remedy in the competition area has been its power to
seek cease and desist orders under section 5 of the FTC Act, which
prohibits "unfair methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices."' The Supreme Court has interpreted the FTC Act
as encompassing any violation of the letter or spirit of the antitrust
laws, as well as an ill-defined general unfairness power, which the
FTC has not sought to use to extend the boundaries of antitrust in
recent years.5 8
The FTC also has obtained disgorgement of unlawful profits un-
der section 13(G) of the FTC Act, a power that it had traditionally
used in consumer protection cases, but only recently applied to its
competition cases as well. 9 Disgorgement seeks to recover the
unlawful gain enjoyed by the defendant, thus distinguishing it from
restitution, which seeks to restore the original position of the victim
of the wrongdoing.60 Disgorgement thus becomes the principal
weapon the FTC has to obtain monetary relief in an antitrust case not
involving contempt of court or violation of some prior administrative
or judicial decree.
The remaining governmental enforcer is at the state rather than
the federal level. The attorneys general of the fifty states, the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and other
United States dependencies and territories each enforce their own
state or territorial level antitrust laws.61 Most of these laws track the
substance of the Sherman Act fairly closely, but each state has
different exemptions, procedures, and remedies. The Supreme Court
is quite clear that the states (and territories) are normally free to
grant greater or lesser rights than the federal antitrust laws without
preemption being an issue.6 One important difference is that federal
57. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). The FTC also enforces consumer protection laws under the
same statutory framework. See generally STEPHANIE KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(2002).
58. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972).
59. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36 (D.D.C. 1999), amended on other
grounds, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
60. The FTC has only used disgorgement in two competition cases and has not yet defined
the remedy in a comprehensive way. The agency, however, has sought public comments on
potential guidelines for the use of this remedy in its antitrust cases. See Press Release, FTC,
FTC Seeks Public Comments on the Use of Disgorgement as a Remedy for Competition
Violations (Dec. 20, 2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/12/disgorgefrn.htm.
61. For a survey of the substance and procedures of each such law, see ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUTES (2d ed. 1999).
62. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 103 (1989).
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antitrust law permits suit for treble damages only for direct purchas-
ers-those who dealt directly with the unlawful price fixers or mo-
nopolists-while a substantial number of states permit suits by
indirect purchasers under state antitrust law. 63
The states also frequently bring suit under the federal antitrust
laws. First, the states purchase an enormous amount of goods and
services. Where they are victims of antitrust violations in their
capacity as purchasers they are entitled to treble damages like any
other private plaintiff.64 Second, the states have been granted parens
patriae powers to sue on behalf of any natural persons in their
jurisdiction who have been injured by reason of any antitrust viola-
tion.65
The states have come under tremendous criticism for their more
activist posture. Critics have argued that the states are merely free
riders on federal enforcement efforts or, when the states pursue a
separate agenda, they are doing so for narrow partisan political
reasons unrelated to sound antitrust and competition policy.66
The states understandably disagree. Their ability to sue on their
own behalf and on behalf of their citizens is enshrined in federal
legislation. Their ability to enact their own state antitrust statutes and
empower their officials and private parties to sue under them flows
from their sovereign status under the Constitution. The states also
dispute the free rider label, pointing to important antitrust litigation
where either the states acted before the federal government, or where
the federal government took no action at all.67 They point to the
efficiency-enhancing aspects of pooling resources and of collective
investigation and prosecution of nationwide cases.68 Finally, the states
have long argued that the state attorneys general are more sensitively
attuned to the issues affecting the citizens of their states than the
federal antitrust agencies could ever be. They can therefore better
63. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 61.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
65. Id. § 15(c).
66. Posner, supra note 1, at 940-41.
67. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (antitrust suit by nineteen
states against insurance companies, following decision by the DOJ not to accept states'
invitation to investigate the industry); see also Carole R. Doris, Another View on State Antitrust
Enforcement- A Reply to Judge Posner, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 345 (2001).
68. See The National Association of Attorneys General, About NAAG, at
http://www.naag.org/naag/about-naag.php (describing as one of its goals the promotion of
cooperation and coordination on interstate legal matters to foster a more responsive and
efficient legal system for state citizens).
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represent the public interest even at the risk of coming under the
sway of interest groups representing competitors of a potential
antitrust defendant.
The final enforcers in our global economy are foreign govern-
ments and their citizens. Such persons have limited rights to sue in
the United States courts for injuries suffered as buyers in the United
States market. Recoveries for competitive injury outside the United
States have almost always been rejected by United States courts. 69
Instead, a growing number of nations have created their own compe-
tition laws or begun to vigorously enforce existing laws including
private rights of action.
Typical examples are the competition laws of the European Un-
ion and Canada. The EU has enterprise-only liability, no criminal
sanctions, but fines reaching up to 10 percent of the annual turnover
of firms violating the EU competition provisions.70 While no fine to
date has reached this level, fines in the hundred of millions of euros
have been imposed on a scale roughly equal to the United States in
certain international cartel cases.71 Private rights of action, including
class actions, exist in several of the member states, although they are
infrequently used.
Canada, which enacted its first competition statute a year before
the Sherman Act, has criminal provisions for the kind of hardcore
cartel and bid rigging violations prosecuted in the United States and a
limited but expanding private right of action. Here too, the govern-
ment has devoted the most resources to cartel cases and has imposed
significant fines often in the same international cartel cases where the
U.S. and EU have already taken action. The first class action in a
competition case was filed recently but dismissed on the merits.73
As a result of so many enforcers, punishment has taken on a
greater significance. What has changed is not just that total punish-
ment has increased, but that it has increased in an unpredictable,
erratic, and somewhat random fashion, leaving some types of viola-
69. See Spencer Weber Waller, The United States as Antitrust Courtroom to the World:
Jurisdiction and Standing Issues in Transnational Litigation, 14 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 523
(2002).
70. See JAMES R. ATWOOD ET AL., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD ch. 16
(3d ed. 2001).
71. See Samantha Mobley & Maitena Arakistain, How the European Commission Sets
Cartel Fines, 14 ANTITRUST 24 (2000).
72. ATWOOD, supra note 70, ch. 17.
73. See [2001] Chadha v. Bayer, Inc., 200 D.L.R. 4th 309 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
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tions subject to a stunning multiple set of fines and damages far in
excess of treble damages, and other types of violations subject to
virtually no criminal or civil liability whatsoever.
IV. GOLDILOCKS AND THE THREE BEARS: WHICH PUNISHMENT IS
JUST RIGHT?
The full weight of antitrust enforcement is brought to bear when
the Department of Justice brings a criminal action or the FTC obtains
disgorgement,7 4 the states bring their own treble damage actions
under the federal and state antitrust laws, direct purchasers sue for
treble damages under the federal antitrust laws, indirect purchasers
sue under state law, and foreign governments and private parties
bring the available actions in the U.S. and abroad. Any lesser combi-
nation obviously imposes less total liability on the culpable defen-
dants. Without private enforcement actions, a defendant could well
escape all liability if the government chooses, for whatever reason,
not to proceed in a particular matter. Which scenario imposes the
"right" amount of punishment through civil damages and criminal
fines is obviously a heavily value-laden determination. What is most
interesting is how little doctrinal differences separate these three
potential scenarios, and how antitrust lacks a coherent theory of
punishment to account for these differences.75
A. Punishment Beyond Treble Damages
Through the aggressive use of a corporate amnesty program and
heavy cooperation between national competition authorities, the
Department of Justice investigated and prosecuted a cartel of vitamin
manufacturers in the late 1990s, the largest known international cartel
in history. The worldwide conspiracy to fix the prices and allocate
markets in the bulk vitamins industry, in violation of section 1,
spawned a wide range of litigation, including criminal prosecution by
the DOJ, private cases in federal and state courts, and various gov-
74. By tradition a federal government investigation case is brought by one but not both of
the antitrust agencies although there is no legal bar to simultaneous enforcement actions.
75. The following case descriptions are adapted from Richard Wolfram & Spencer Weber
Waller, Contemporary Antitrust Federalism: Cluster Bombs or Rough Justice?, in ANTITRUST
LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 3 (2d ed. 2002) (exploring these scenarios in greater detail along
with other examples of the haphazard nature of antitrust enforcement by differing coalitions of
plaintiffs).
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ernmental cases around the world.76 In the end, a coalition of state
attorneys general, some not even originally litigants, were also able to
obtain substantial settlements from the defendants.
The defendants are manufacturers of bulk vitamins, which are
used in the production of a wide variety of food products, such as
animal feed, soft drinks, and breakfast cereal. All of the corporate
defendants and a number of individuals pleaded guilty in some
twenty-five different criminal cases to charges of criminal price fixing.
Hoffman-La Roche alone agreed to pay a record $500 million and
BASF agreed to pay $225 million.77 Total U.S. criminal fines imposed
on all the defendants exceeded $1 billion."M In light of the pending
and contemplated treble damage suits, restitution was waived in the
guilty pleas with the defendants.7 9
The corporate defendants in the DOJ prosecutions were also
named in a number of private cases brought in federal district courts
around the country by large companies that bought directly from the
vitamin manufacturers for use in the preparation of animal feed and
food for human consumption. The federal cases were consolidated in
a multidistrict class action in the District of Columbia.
Seven of the defendants entered into a settlement agreement
agreeing to pay approximately $1.05 billion, plus $122 million in
counsel fees.80 Three of the defendants-BASF, Hoffman-La Roche,
and Rhone-Poulenc-were responsible for paying $900 million of the
total figure. Although Rhone-Poulenc was a defendant and paid
substantial damages in the civil settlement, the company was not
charged in the criminal prosecution because of its cooperation under
the DOJ amnesty program."1 Several hundred plaintiffs have opted-
out of the settlement and the settlement figure was reduced pursuant
76. See Crawford v. F. Hoffman La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2001) (removed to
district court on defendant's motion; complaint originally filed in Arkansas state court); In re
Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, No. 99-197, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8931 (D.D.C. 2000); XF
Enters., Inc. v. BASF Corp., No. 99-3693, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16834 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(defendant removed the case to district court, and upon plaintiff's motion, the case was
remanded back to Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas).
77. See Vitamin Cartel Investigation Nets Four More Former Executives, 78 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. 408 (2000).
78. Hammond, supra note 52, at 572.
79. United States v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., Crim. No. 99-CR-184-R, Guilty Plea (Filed
May 20, 1999).
80. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 209 F.R.D. 251, 255 n. 7 (D.D.C. 2002).
81. See Press Release, Department of Justice, F. Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF Agree to
Pay Record Criminal Fines for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel (May 20, 1999). at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/May/196at.htm.
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to a formula in the settlement agreement."2 To ensure that the
settling plaintiffs are not shortchanged vis-A-vis the opt-outs, the
settlement agreement contains a most-favored nations clause that
requires a settling defendant to pay the settlement class additional
money if a settling defendant agrees to pay any opt-out claimant
proportionally more than the money made available to the members
of the class with respect to any vitamin product.83
A number-although not all-of the corporations named as de-
fendants in the DOJ and private federal actions were also sued in
private actions in state courts in some fifteen states and the District of
Columbia, based on the same alleged facts underlying the federal
actions.8 The plaintiffs were for the most part indirect purchasers
and their claims were based on state law.85 These suits were brought
in states that allow indirect purchaser claims.86 None of the plaintiffs
in the private federal actions are plaintiffs in any of the state court
actions.
The attorneys general of twenty-two states, Puerto Rico, and the
District of Columbia eventually entered into proposed settlement
agreements totaling $340 million with six leading vitamins manufac-
turers that were also named as defendants in the private, state court
actions brought in fifteen states and the District of Columbia. 7 Those
82. In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, No. 99-197, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8931
(D.D.C. 2000) at *20-*29.
83. Twelve of the defendants in the federal actions, who also had plead guilty to the DOJ
charges, did not join in the settlement of the multidistrict federal action. In May 2000, the D.C.
district court denied most of their motions to dismiss, which were based in part on arguments
that claims by indirect purchaser plaintiffs (who constitute a small percentage of the plaintiff
class) under state law were legally insufficient.
84. Crawford v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2001) (case removed to
district court on defendant's motion; complaint originally filed in Arkansas state court); Greene
v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., No. 99-197, 2001 WL 849928 (D.D.C.) (case removed from the
state court in Tennessee to the district court in District of Columbia): Valerie Ciardi v.
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., No. 99-3244. 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 615 (2000) (Mass. Sup. Ct.);
Anile Pharmacy, Inc. v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., No. 99-197, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11348
(D.D.C. 2000) (removed to district court upon defendant's motion; plaintiff moved to remand
the case to the Circuit Court of Hancock County, West Virginia); XF Enters., Inc. v. BASF
Corp., No. 99-3693, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16834 (E.D. Pa.) (defendant removed the case to
district court, and upon plaintiff's motion, the case was remanded back to Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas).
85. Valerie Ciardi v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., No, 99-3244, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 615
(2000) (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2000).
86. Id.
87. See Press Release, Office of the California Attorney General, Attorney General
Lockyer Announces $80 Million Antitrust Settlement Involving Alleged International Vitamins
Price-Fixing Scheme (Oct.10, 2000), at http://www.caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2000/00-129.htm
[hereinafter Press Release, $80 Million Antitrust Settlement]; Press Release, Office of the
Vermont Attorney General, Attorney General Sorrell Announces Historic Settlements In
2003]
HeinOnline  -- 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
 223 2003
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
companies collectively account for 80 percent of the world vitamins
market and included Roche, BASF, and Rhone.88 The litigation
continues against the smaller nonsettling vitamins manufacturers.
Twenty-three of the participating jurisdictions wotild receive a
predetermined share of a $118 million pool to compensate for dam-
ages to consumers. 9 The attorney general in each jurisdiction would
decide how that state's allocation would be distributed.90 An addi-
tional $107 million would be deposited in a business settlement fund
to reimburse damaged businesses in each of these twenty-three
jurisdictions. 9' A separate settlement agreement, in the amount of
$85 million, was reached with California. 92 Finally, $30 million would
be used to reimburse forty-seven state governments-all twenty-four
parties to the settlement agreements plus twenty-three more-for
overcharges on direct and indirect state purchases of products con-
taining vitamins.93
Outside the United States, these same defendants were the target
of much government litigation, but few private actions to date. In the
European Union, the vitamin defendants were fined an additional
855.22 million euros with Hoffman-La Roche, as the principal con-
spirator, alone paying a fine of 462 million euros.94 BASF's fine in
Europe was 296.16 million euros, exceeding its fine in the United
States criminal proceedings.95 In Canada, the various defendants
entered guilty pleas and paid fines of nearly Can$100 million (ap-
proximately US$68 million) with Roche paying Can$48 million of
that total (approximately US$32.6 million).96  Similar but smaller
Antitrust Suits Against International Price-Fixing Cartel (Oct. 10, 2000), at
http://www.state.vt.us/atg/pressI0102000.htm.
88. See Press Release, $80 Million Antitrust Settlement, supra note 87.
89. Wolfram & Waller, supra note 75, at 39.
90. For instance, the Illinois AG has indicated that nonprofit charitable groups that
promote health and nutrition would receive the majority of its share while the New York AG
has said that the majority of its share would fund programs concerning prenatal care, nutrition,
and hunger.
91. Wolfram & Waller, supra note 75, at 39.
92. Press Release, $80 Million Antitrust Settlement, supra note 87.
93. Id.
94. EU Fines Eight Companies for Roles in Vitamin Cartels, 81 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. 483 (2001).
95. Id.
96. Canadian Court Levies $1 Million Fine in Vitamins Price Fixing Conspiracy Case, 78
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 349 (2000); Canadian Court Levies $5.2 Million Fine in
Vitamins Price-Fixing Conspiracy Case, 78 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 259 (2000).
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enforcement actions have taken place or are pending in Australia,
Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, and Korea. 97
When all is said and done, the Vitamins defendants will be well
punished for one of the most serious and long-running price fixing
schemes in history. But how will that punishment stack up to the
treble damage norm? Estimating a ratio between total punishment
and harm is difficult to calculate but the ratio appears to be well over
three to one. If the amount of commerce and the amount of harm
reported in the plea agreement is close to accurate, then the defen-
dants (except the cooperating Rhone-Poulenc) have already paid,
through the criminal fine, double the damages caused. With the
prima facie effect of the criminal plea, the plaintiffs in the direct and
indirect purchaser suits and the states had little incentive to give
much of a settling discount. The total civil settlements approach 150
percent of the criminal fine, suggesting that the settling defendants
have paid the settling plaintiffs approximately treble damages on top
the double damages fine to the government. This is with the un-
known amount of opt-out liability (minus any offsets specified in the
settlement agreements) and liability against nonsettling defendants.
While the fines paid to the foreign governments and in foreign
private actions are calculated on the basis of the effects in those
jurisdictions, such actions are in large part another type of follow-on
suit once the conduct was detected and punished in the United States.
The amounts paid are thus part of the total punishment paid by the
defendant. With such fines totaling approximately another $1 billion,
the total ratio of punishment to harm begins to approach seven to
one. Even adjusted for the lack of prejudgment interest, possible
payments of attorneys' fees beyond what defendants were required to
cover, and uncompensated dead weight loss to society, tax effects,
and the waiver of restitution in the guilty pleas,98 one is likely to end
with a ratio of substantially higher than three to one.
97. See Press Release, Commerce Commission, Commission Says BASF, Roche, and
Rhone Were Price Fixing, but NZ Limitation Period and International Jurisdiction Issues
Prevent New Zealand Court Action (May 2001), at
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/publications/display-mr.cfm?mr-id=772; Press Release, Japanese
Fair Trade Commission, Warnings Against Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. & Eisai Co., Ltd.
(April 5, 2001), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/press/2001/200lO405vitamin.pdf.;
Federal Court Imposes Record $26M Penalties Against Vitamin Suppliers, available at
http://203.6.251.7.accc.Internet/media/search/viewmedia.cfm?RecordlD=267 (Mar. 1 2001)
(describing record fine in Australia of Roche, BASF, and other participant in vitamins cartel).
98. See Lande, supra note 2 (analyzing all the potential offsets to treble damages that
render them effectively equal to compensatory damages alone). All the offsets identified by
Lande are not as strongly applicable in the Vitamins setting. Few if any damages were lost to
2003]
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B. This One Is About Right
Not all government/private antitrust litigation has the look and
feel of a rugby scrum, with plaintiffs piling on the guilty defendants
for lawful and arguably late hits. On occasion, the various parties
cooperate from the start-or reach a unified stance once the litigation
proceeds-and obtain a global resolution.
1. Mylan
In 1998 and 1999, the FTC, thirty-two states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and a number of direct and indirect purchasers sued Mylan
Laboratories, Inc., the second largest generic drug manufacturer in
the U.S. Mylan was charged with monopolizing the production of
two antidepressant drugs by obtaining exclusive rights over their key
ingredients. Mylan allegedly raised the price of each product by 1,900
percent or more. The products were sold to state Medicaid programs,
wholesalers, retail pharmacy chains, and other customers.
The FTC sought equitable relief, including a permanent injunc-
tion barring Mylan from engaging in conduct that violates FTC Act
section 5(a), rescission of certain enabling license agreements and
restitution,99 and disgorgement-° in an amount exceeding $120 million
plus interest.
On the same day that the FTC filed its suit against Mylan, the
state attorneys general of fifteen states filed a parallel suit against
Mylan, in the same court, based on the same underlying conduct. 101
statute of limitations problems. Managerial costs to the plaintiffs were minimal in view of the
successful government case and the early settlement of the civil cases. "Umbrella" effects
appeared to be incidental since the cartel encompassed the vast majority of worldwide vitamin
production and little substitution took place.
99. The equitable remedy of restitution requires that the wrongdoer restore the injured
person to the status quo ante. The injured person is entitled to the difference between the price
it paid before the illegal conduct and the price it paid after the conduct. In the case of an
anticompetitive overcharge, there can be multiple layers of buyers, direct and indirect, from the
manufacturer. This is due, of course, to the possibility of margins being added at each level of a
multi-level system of distribution. See Ivy Johnson, Note, Restitution on Behalf of Indirect
Purchasers: Opening the Backdoor to Illinois Brick, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1005 (2000).
100. The equitable remedy of disgorgement, unlike restitution, does not aim primarily to
compensate the victims of wrongful acts: instead, it is intended to deny the wrongdoer of his or
her unjust enrichment and to serve as a deterrent. It wrests ill-gotten gains from the hands of
the wrongdoer. Disgorgement would equal the amount of the alleged overcharge by the
manufacturer to the first buyer in the distribution chain. The FTC sought disgorgement under
§ 13(b) of the FIC Act, a provision under which disgorgement had previously been ordered in
consumer protection cases, but not in competition cases.
101. Alaska v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., No. 98 CV 03115, Complaint (D.D.C., complaint
filed Dec. 22, 1998).
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Eventually seventeen additional states and the District of Columbia
joined the case. The states sued in their parens patriae capacity under
both federal and state law on behalf of natural persons, and also in
their sovereign capacity on behalf of each state's general economy
and as injured purchasers or reimbursers under state Medicaid and
other programs. The states sought, among other remedies, a perma-
nent injunction, treble damages, appropriate relief under applicable
state statutes, and other equitable relief under federal law, including
disgorgement and restitution.
On November 29, 2000, the FTC approved a settlement with My-
lan, which at the insistence of the defendant also included all fifty
states and the District of Columbia, and a variety of other purchasers
(including insurance companies, but not direct purchasers), in which
Mylan agreed to pay $147 million to settle the suits.102 Mylan agreed
to pay $100 million into a fund to compensate injured consumers and
state agencies, plus $8 million in legal fees.103 An additional $35
million will be used to settle private suits by large institutional buyers,
such as insurance companies, and the remaining $4 million will cover
additional legal costs.,,,, Mylan further agreed to injunctive relief.
The agreement does not cover several additional suits brought by
certain alleged direct buyers of the drugs at issue.
Some twenty-five additional private actions were filed shortly
thereafter against Mylan in federal and state courts around the
country.105 The claims were essentially the same as those in the FTC
and state actions. Plaintiffs included alleged direct purchasers, such
as drug wholesalers, health care delivery systems, managed health
care companies, and pharmacists, and indirect purchasers, such as
consumers (filing in some twenty putative class action suits), third-
party payors, pharmacies, and health centers. Virtually all of the
federal and state cases against Mylan and its co-defendants have been
coordinated for pretrial proceedings in the District of Columbia
federal district court in order to avoid duplicating discovery already
produced in the FIC's and states' actions. The plaintiff class of direct
purchasers has been certified by the District Court and the D.C.
Circuit recently denied the defendants request for interlocutory
102. The court approved the settlement in February 2002. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate
Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369 (D.D.C. 2002).
103. Id. at 373.
104. Id. at 394, 399.
105. See In Re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2002); In Re
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 202 F.R.D. 12 (D.D.C. 2001).
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appeal of that decision. 16 While previous settlement discussions
failed, some future settlement is expected, which would involve a
further payout by Mylan and the codefendants.
2. Nine West
The recent litigation by the FTC, the states, and consumers
against the U.S. shoe company Nine West Group for minimum resale
price maintenance highlights another offshoot of the trend toward
multiple actions relating to the same conduct. In this case, the tension
was not between federal and state enforcement. Instead, the case
explored the tension between state parens patriae enforcement and
proposed class actions by consumers. Competing actions sought to
represent the interests of consumers of Nine West shoes-the case
brought by state attorneys general, acting on behalf of the natural
citizens of their states, and the proposed class actions brought by the
consumers themselves. Unlike in the Mylan litigation, there was no
issue of duplicative recovery of damages as between the States and
the FTC, because the FTC sought only injunctive relief.
Nine West holds that parens patriae actions are superior to con-
sumer class actions. But the law's answer as to who may lead the
chase in these circumstances-the states-still begs the question of
who gets the money. Leaving that question to the states may result in
a different resolution than if it is left to the class action plaintiffs and
their counsel. In this case, the settlement agreement between the
defendants and the states provides for distribution of the settlement
figure to fund women's health, educational, vocational, and safety
programs under the cy pres principle.10 7 If the private actions had
been allowed to take precedence over the states' actions, however,
the distribution of a settlement fund would undoubtedly have been
different.
In March 2000, the FTC simultaneously filed a complaint and en-
tered into a consent decree with Nine West Group, settling charges
under section 5 of the FTC Act that the company had engaged in
illegal resale price fixing with certain dealers to maintain minimum
106. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
107. For a discussion on the cy pres principle, see Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons From
the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State
Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361 (1999).
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prices on its shoes. 0 8 The FIC complaint charged that in 1998 Nine
West fixed, raised, and stabilized retail prices of its brands of shoes. 1°9
The FTC's consent order is injunctive only. It prohibits Nine West
from directly or indirectly fixing the price at which its dealers adver-
tise or sell its shoes. °10 The FTC did not seek or obtain disgorgement,
restitution, or any other form of monetary relief.
Before the FTC complaint, but after the FTC and the states had
begun their investigations, some twenty-five proposed class actions
were filed in federal court by and on behalf of consumers who bought
Nine West shoes after January 1, 1988, against Nine West Group, Inc.
and ten department store chains that sell its women's shoes. The
actions were consolidated in March 1999 in the Southern District of
New York."' In January 2000, the federal district court denied a
motion to dismiss by Nine West and the ten department store chain
defendants that sell Nine West shoes." 2 But then counsel for the
proposed class conditionally agreed to withdraw their claims in view
of the proposed settlement agreement between Nine West and the
states."3
On the same day that the FTC entered into a proposed settle-
ment with Nine West, the attorneys general of the 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories, commonwealths, and
possessions, simultaneously filed a complaint and entered into a
proposed settlement agreement on their own behalf, in their sover-
eign capacity, and in their parens patriae capacity, under section 4(c)
of the Clayton Act, on behalf of their (natural person) citizens who
purchased Nine West products during the relevant period. The
settlement agreement provides for injunctive relief and for the
payment to the states of $34 million in damages to fund women's
health, educational, vocational, and safety programs. The settlement
resolved all claims against the defendants-Nine West and ten
retailers-on behalf of residents of the plaintiff states for antitrust
108. FTC, NINE WEST GROUP, INC: ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER TO AID
PUBLIC COMMENT, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/9westan.htm.
109. FTC COMPLAINT, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/9westcomp.htm; Press Release,
FTC, Nine West Settles State and Federal Price Fixing Charges (March 6, 2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/03/ninewest.htm.
110. FTC DECISION AND ORDER, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/9west.do.htm.
111. Gruen v. Nine West Group Inc., No. 99 Civ. 0245, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20682
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
112. In re Nine West Shoes Antitrust Litigation, 80 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
113. Counsel for the proposed class also represented that Nine West was prepared to pay
them $800,000 in attorneys' fees.
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violations related to the sale of Nine West shoes during the relevant
period.114 Because of the relatively small amount of money sought
and the large number of consumers, cy pres distribution, rather than a
de minimis distribution to hundreds of thousands of consumers,
appeared to be the logical remedy.' 5 The claims stated in the states'
complaint were substantially similar to the claims in the private
actions and ultimately counsel for the private actions agreed to the cy
pres settlement in lieu of further litigation.
C. This One Is Too Small: Nobody Has Been Enforcing These
Antitrust Laws
Rounding out the panoply of possibilities in the area of antitrust
enforcement are the numerous scenarios in which defendants that
engaged in illegal activity receive no punishment whatsoever for their
conduct. Some unlawful conduct simply will never be detected and
other conduct will go unchallenged for failure of proof. But the
peculiarities of antitrust enforcement mean that many provable and
observable violations will go unchallenged. At the federal level,
enforcement priorities change from administration to administration,
or with appointment of a new Assistant Attorney General or FTC
chair. For ideological reasons, budgetary constraints, and staff
workloads, cases may never be brought that would have been a front-
burner issue at another time.
Any drop or change in the composition of governmental cases is
reflected in the amount and nature of private litigation. The knowl-
edge of the existence of a federal grand jury (or FTC investigation) is
virtually all that is required for the filing of a good faith class action
price fixing case. Without the criminal investigation and eventual
prosecution, private counsel on contingent fee have to make the
difficult choice to invest their more limited resources to uncover and
document hardcore antitrust violations that have been carefully
concealed by the defendants, and confront the harsh possibilities of
Rule 11 sanctions.
For cases involving a rule of reason, rather than per se theory of
liability, a governmental case is almost a prerequisite to private
damage suits since private plaintiffs and counsel will rarely have the
114. Florida v. Nine West Group, 00 Civ. 1707, Final Judgment and Consent Decree (Dec.
14, 2000).
115. See Farmer, supra note 107.
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resources or inclination to develop the full market definition, market
power, economic, and factual analysis necessary to proceed with such
cases. Moreover, the courts have been ruthless in using theories of
standing, direct purchasers theory, and antitrust injury to winnow out
such claims on procedural rather than substantive grounds. 116 Faced
with such obstacles not found in other substantive areas of the law,
competent plaintiff counsel will simply prefer to invest their time and
resources in per se antitrust violations or other areas of the law where
the case has a higher expected return to them and their clients.
It is obviously difficult to discuss or document the cases that are
never brought. However, the short answer is that federal governmen-
tal enforcement beyond the hardcore price fixing, market division,
and market allocation cases is sporadic and entirely dependent on
presidential politics and antitrust ideology.
For example, resale price maintenance cases (vertical price fix-
ing), although per se illegal since the beginning of the twentieth
century, "7 were simply abandoned by the Reagan administration
because of ideological concerns that such practices may enhance
efficiency, regardless of their legal status. A handful of federal
government cases began to trickle back into the system during the
first Bush administration and during the Clinton years, with the
current Bush administration not yet returning to this area of antitrust
enforcement. Enforcement of this area of the law revived with the
states acting in cooperation with the FTC during the Clinton era and
has continued through various multistate task forces, regardless of
federal involvement.
Antitrust ideology sometimes is far more important than party
politics. Neither federal agency has meaningfully enforced the price
discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act for decades.
A consensus simply has developed that the Act runs counter to the
core procompetitive message of the rest of the antitrust laws, and that
while repeal is not politically feasible, enforcement can safely be left
to injured private parties who find it worth their while to sue for their
own damages.
Ideological swings also appear to be the most powerful explana-
tions for the large monopolization cases as well. The unique political,
116. Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for
Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. Purr. L. REV. 437 (2001) (discussing private enforcement
of antitrust laws in light of restrictive Supreme Court and lower court decisions).
117. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,408 (1911).
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economic, and high-tech concerns of the Clinton administration begat
the government's Microsoft case which would have been inconceiv-
able in a prior administration. The current administration's rush to
settle the suit on substantially less stringent terms than its predecessor
strongly suggests that the suit would not have been brought or
brought in a dramatically more limited form. Yet without the gov-
ernment case and the prima facie effect of its victory, few if any of the
subsequent private suits would have been brought.
Even in the private cases that are brought, a strong argument ex-
ists that a true treble damage remedy is illusory for most plaintiffs.
Professor Robert Lande, in a detailed and thoughtful article from
1988, discussed all the factors that reduce the statutory availability of
treble damages to something less than even compensatory damages in
the real world for the average plaintiff."8 Lande adjusted the treble
damage baseline for such factors as the lack of prejudgment interest,
the effects of the statute of limitations, uncompensated attorneys' fees
and costs, other litigation costs to plaintiffs such as management time
and business disruption, costs to the judicial system in handling
antitrust cases, umbrella effects of market power, allocative ineffi-
ciency costs of market power, and tax effects." 9 He concludes that
the average award is between 43 percent of the actual damages and
1.49 times the actual damages, thus for the most part below actual
damages, let alone the supposed treble damage norm. 20 While
Professor Lande's calculations are a complex blend of different
assumptions and estimates, they strongly indicate that even a success-
ful recovery might not approach the treble damages we assume are
the norm.
Lande's project, however, seeks to prove a somewhat different
point from this Article. First, Lande specifically eschews a punish-
ment perspective focusing on the familiar deterrence and compensa-
tion rationales for treble damages. Second, he seeks to show that
antitrust damages systematically "underdeter" and undercompensate
in comparison to the statutory treble damage remedy. His work is
also based in the realities of the late 1980s, when the current world of
multiple enforcers and punishments was just beginning to take shape.
118. Lande, supra note 2.
119. Id. at 118.
120. Id. at 163, 166-67. Lande's conclusions are echoed in an earlier less elaborate
evaluation of the punitive and compensatory elements of actual treble damage awards. See
Parker, supra note 20, at 290-92; Alfred L. Parker, Treble Damage action-A Financial
Deterrent to Antitrust Violations?, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 483 (1971).
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The world has evolved to a place where it is impossible to predict
when total punishment will exceed, meet, or even come close to
either the treble damage norm or Lande's more pessimistic outcomes.
Because of this unpredictability, outright incoherence permeates the
antitrust laws.
V. THE PUNISHMENT GAP
From a punishment perspective, there are too many options to
even model the average monetary punishment for an antitrust defen-
dant in relation to the gains enjoyed or the losses caused. As a
practical matter the range runs from zero to the multiple in the
Vitamins litigation, since it is hard to imagine total punishment on a
global basis much greater than the facts of that case.
Whether the conduct is detected in a timely fashion, which fed-
eral agency brings the case, whether the case is civil or criminal,
whether the agency seeks disgorgement, restitution, or injunctive
relief, whether there is a final judgment with prima facie effect,
whether the states weigh in as plaintiffs as purchasers or as parens
patriae, whether there are direct purchaser business plaintiffs who sue
separately, whether indirect purchasers may bring their actions under
state antitrust laws, whether there are significant opt-outs from any of
the class actions, and whether defendants essentially buy global peace
by including for settlement purposes all states and other potential
plaintiffs not yet in the picture are all factors which must be weighed.
The multitude of potential plaintiffs and recoveries does, how-
ever, promote regression away from the extremes and toward some
middle ground. Only in garden-variety price fixing cases is it nearly
certain that all potential plaintiffs will bring actions. Even here, it is
only the FTC or the DOJ (and in the real world the DOJ as the
exclusive federal criminal enforcer) who will be involved. At the
other end of the spectrum, having so many enforcers creates incen-
tives and rewards that suggest it is relatively rare that serious anti-
competitive conduct will escape all notice and not be subject to some
litigation. Tilting the system slightly toward the high end is the ability
of potential plaintiffs to observe a litigation or investigative success
and then bring a later (but not time-barred) action of their own.
What is most troublesome is the wide ground in the middle, where
total monetary punishment ranges from the nominal to the hundreds
of millions of dollars without a convincing rationale or a means of
predicting the difference.
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In Vitamins, the full fury of the antitrust laws was unleashed be-
cause of the happy coincidence of price fixing being universally
condemned by all the parties in the United States and abroad coupled
with the incentive to bring enforcement actions. In contrast, cases
like Mylan only occurred because the Pitofsky-led FTC sought to test
the limit of the Commission's restitution powers under section 13(G).
Without the will to do so, the total punishment would have been
significantly reduced and some of the follow-on cases may never have
seen the light of day. Nine West was the product of the FTC and the
states revitalizing the enforcement of the antitrust laws against
vertical price fixing, a practice left unchallenged under the Regan
administration. All of these cases represent core violations of the
Sherman Act with very little to distinguish them, except dumb luck, in
the total punishment meted out at the end of the day.
Hoffman-La Roche, the ringleader in the Vitamins cartel, has
now plead and allocuted to the full factual predicate charged in the
government information for its decade-long price fixing scheme.
Since charge bargaining is severely limited under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, and since sentencing is based on actual conduct,
Hoffman's agreed fine of $500 million suggests actual gain or loss
caused of approximately $250 million for the U.S. market then
doubled under the alternative fine statute. Hoffman has paid or will
pay approximately an additional $500 million in civil damages in the
class action settlement and to opt-out plaintiffs, over $100 million to
the states, and over $500 million more in fines to foreign govern-
ments. Based solely on harm to the US market Hoffman will have
paid in excess of six times the harm it caused (or its gain), a rather
high price in comparison to the formal availability of treble damages
to a successful plaintiff. Roche's total monetary punishment would
have been even greater if it had not received a reduction in the fine
called for by the Sentencing Guideline for its future cooperation.'21
At least one of its coconspirators, Rhone-Poulenc paid a hefty, but
substantially lower, multiple of total punishment than Roche because
of the classic prisoner's dilemma effect of its decision to report the
conspiracy and cooperate with the government under the corporate
amnesty program.
In contrast, Mylan paid $147 million for as close to total global
peace as it could muster. The FTC has no statutory means of extract-
121. United States v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., Crim. No. 99-CR-184-R, Guilty Plea 11
(filed May 20, 1999).
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ing multiple fines or damages from a defendant, but it was successful
in pressing its claim for disgorgement, which would be equal to the
amount unlawfully gained by the defendant. By agreement, this was
divided up between the states' claims for treble damages for direct
purchases by the states themselves, and the indirect purchasers'
claims brought by natural persons. Even those states which never
sued or those which could not have sued under state and federal
antitrust law received nominal payments in the name of total settle-
ment and peace. Also separate was the settlement for alleged direct
purchases by third-party payors. Both states and private parties also
received attorneys' fees and costs.
Even this substantial amount of agreed disgorgement is likely to
be on the low side to the extent that the bargaining between the
parties over the settlement reflected any discount for the legal risk
the FTC bore on appeal for relying on its novel theory of disgorge-
ment and its voluntary decision to share the disgorgement pie with
the other plaintiffs. The global settlement also strongly suggests that
the total payments were a pragmatic reflection of the total resources
Mylan could pay and still remain a solvent, ongoing concern. 122 While
Mylan's total liability remains unresolved in the private class actions,
it is by no means clear that at the end of the day Mylan's punishment
adds up to anywhere near the statutory treble damages, even allowing
for a degree of multiple recovery by both direct and indirect purchas-
ers.
Strangely enough, Nine West may well be the only defendant
whose punishment approximated the statutory norm. While it agreed
to only injunctive relief with the FTC, it also settled its liability to
both the states and the private plaintiffs with a single lump-sum
settlement. Subject to any discount for litigation risk, this amount
does not appear to be subject to other significant discounts. The legal
theory and the remedies sought were not novel, the plaintiffs were all
well-funded, experienced litigants with no suggestion they were in it
just for a quick kill. There was little incentive to settle for much
below the treble damage norm, especially with settlement with the
FTC dependent on doing the right thing with the other plaintiffs.
With the states winning the argument over private counsel for the
legal right to represent natural plaintiffs, and private counsel essen-
tially withdrawing from the field, the agreed settlement will be
122. See In re Lorazeparn & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369,394 (D.D.C. 2002).
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distributed on a cy pres basis to women's groups as opposed to small
payments or a fluid recovery through the private class action process.
While this makes analyzing the question of compensation difficult, it
does not affect the punishment value of the settlement, which is the
same regardless of how it is distributed.
There are countless permutations on this theme. Some defen-
dants may justifiably feel they have whipsawed into multiple and
draconian payments in comparison to similarly situated antitrust
violators. Others may walk away nearly scot-free for similar conduct.
A multiplicity of actors in the United States, and increasingly around
the world, ensures the result of this game is rarely zero, but the final
outcomes of the cases work against any consistency or logic in how we
punish antitrust violations.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust long ago diverged from its common law torts roots. It
substituted a statutory treble damage remedy and a statutory excep-
tion from the American rule for attorneys' fees for the normal rules
otherwise applicable in civil litigation. Normal theories of contribu-
tion have been explicitly rejected and deductions for settlements paid
only occur after, not before trebling. The drafters of these provisions
and doctrines believed they were creating a powerful weapon to
punish particular types of anticompetitive business behavior. Addi-
tional penalties and enforcers have been created or empowered to
better enter the fray.
The results in the modern world are not perverse as much as they
are random, with certain conduct and defendants punished far in
excess of the specified treble damage baseline, while other, similar
conduct goes virtually unpunished. The continuing debate over
deterrence and compensation has only partially explained these
distinctions. It is time for increased attention to traditional notions of
punishment and a greater reconnection to the tort world to take their
rightful place at the table to guide a return to a coherent theory of
antitrust damages.
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